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INTERNATIONAL COLLECTIVE ACTION: CONCENTRATION INDICES IN SELECTED AREAS
Source: Bruegel. Note: the figure indicates in which areas of international cooperation collective action might be more effective, on the basis that collective action 
tends to be easier when significant players are only a few. The figure adapts the Herfindahl index of market concentration, which varies between zero (perfect ato-
misation) and one (complete concentration). The concentration scores are much higher for competition policy and banking regulation than for trade and internet 
regulation. The index is also influenced by whether EU countries act individually or jointly. See https://bruegel.org/2019/08/how-long-is-the-head-table/.
THE ISSUE
There is a greater need than ever for international collective action. From climate 
preservation to financial stability and internet security, heightened interdependence calls 
for common responses to global threats. Obstacles to global collective action are no less 
formidable. Beyond President Trump’s stance and worldwide concerns over sovereignty, 
the China-US rivalry and the emergence of a multipolar world are impediments of 
a structural nature. The legal and institutional architecture of the rules-based global 
governance system looks increasingly incomplete and obsolete. A process of fragmentation 
has started to affect its core tenets. None of the main players is providing leadership. The 
US is increasingly questioning its post-war role; China is reluctant to invest in a system 
designed by others; Europe remains too weak and fragmented to offer sufficient leadership.
POLICY CHALLENGE
International collective action is in search of a new paradigm. It cannot rely anymore on 
global binding rules supported by universal institutions. New forms of cooperation have 
emerged in a number of fields. These are soft pledge-and-review mechanisms, cooperation 
between independent agencies, regional groupings, coalitions of the willing and open 
partnerships involving non-state participants and knowledge networks. To maximise the 
effectiveness of such arrangements, they should rely on a limited set of universal principles 
and be served by nimble and legitimate institutions. Existing international institutions 
should be regarded as globalisation’s social capital. There are problems that will not be 
solved without having recourse to strong participation and enforcement mechanisms such 
as sanctions or pecuniary incentives. Europe should equip itself to be an effective player in 
this new global game. This calls for internal governance reforms. 
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This Policy Brief is based on 
research undertaken jointly 
with George Papaconstantinou 
at the European University 
Institute, a summary of 
which can be found in 
Papaconstantinou, G. and J. 
Pisani-Ferry (eds) (2019) 
Global Governance: Demise or 
Transformation? EUI e-book, 
available at https://tgg.eui.
eu/wp-content/uploads/
sites/39/2019/08/eBook_
Global.Governance.Demise.or_.
Transformation.pdf. 
This Policy Brief also builds 
on remarks given on 22 
March 2019 at the European 
Central Bank colloquium 
‘Challenges for supervisors 
and central bankers’, 
organised to mark the end of 
the tenure of Ignazio Angeloni 
as a member of the ECB 
Supervisory Board. Thanks to 
Adrien Bradley, Pascal Lamy, 
Manuel Lafont-Rapnouil, 
George Papaconstantinou, 
Francesco Papadia, André 
Sapir, Reinhilde Veugelers, 
Nicolas Véron, Guntram 
Wolff and Georg Zachmann 
for comments on earlier 
versions.
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1 STATE OF PLAY
There is a greater need for interna-
tional collective action than ever 
before. The threats of catastrophic cli-
mate change and biodiversity collapse 
demonstrate the increased importance 
of global commons and the urgency of 
coordinating responses at global level. 
But the need for collective action also 
arises from risks to financial stability, 
threats to internet security, tax avoid-
ance by multinational firms and mass 
migration, to name only some of the 
most prominent challenges.
The 1990s represented the 
high water mark of the collective 
action model characteristic of the 
post-second world war system. 
This system relied on universal, 
treaty-based institutions tasked with 
the organisation of international 
cooperation and the enforcement of 
legally binding rules in major fields 
of interdependence. At the time, the 
template became truly universal as 
membership of the Bretton Woods 
institutions was extended to Russia 
and the former Soviet bloc, while 
preparations were made for Chinese 
and Russian membership of the World 
Trade Organisation. However, efforts to 
replicate this template in fields such as 
investment, competition and climate 
action have been frustrated.
Once regarded as a milestone 
on the way to completing the 
institutional architecture of 
globalisation, the creation of the WTO 
did not achieve its aims. Since the 
mid-1990s, multilateral negotiations 
have stalled, trade governance 
has fragmented into a myriad of 
preferential agreements, and China’s 
membership of the WTO has failed to 
trigger the convergence of its economic 
system (let alone its political system) 
with the Western model. The essential 
principles of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
the dispute settlement mechanism 
instituted with the creation of the WTO 
were nevertheless upheld, until the 
Trump administration’s deliberate 
sabotage undermined the core tenets of 
the post-war order.
For the Bretton Woods institutions, 
the Asian crisis of the late 1990s 
was a turning point. Intrusive and 
economically misguided International 
Monetary Fund programmes were 
considered proof that these institutions 
were at the service of the Western 
powers. A decade later, the multilateral 
response to the euro crisis was regarded 
as further evidence of this built-in bias.
The global financial crisis did 
not result in a permanent upgrade 
to global governance. The response 
to the financial meltdown and the 
ensuing recession was swift and 
forceful, and the elevation of the G20 
to leaders’ level adjusted the political 
leadership body to the new reality of 
the global economy. But nevertheless 
changes to the rules and institutions 
of global governance fell short of the 
leaders’ 2009 promise that “a global 
crisis requires a global solution”1. 
Financial regulation was upgraded, 
but international macroeconomic 
coordination was short-lived and 
hopes that the crisis would provide an 
opportunity to reform the international 
monetary system were frustrated.
The urgency of climate change 
mitigation has not resulted in a 
revival of the post-war template. At 
Kyoto in 1997 and Copenhagen in 2009, 
attempts to create a legally binding, 
enforceable system of negotiated 
emission reduction commitments 
failed. The Paris Agreement of 2015 
was based on an entirely different 
paradigm: national ‘contributions’ that 
are unilaterally determined and non-
binding. The expected effectiveness 
of the collective endeavour to contain 
the rise in temperature relies on soft 
mechanisms: review procedures, peer 
pressure and the involvement of non-
state participants.
The governance of the internet 
epitomises the obsolescence of the 
post-war model. The emergence 
of the first truly global, borderless 
infrastructure has essentially been 
based on uncoordinated state and 
private initiatives based on broad 
principles and a series of information 
exchange protocols. Its governance 
1. G20 London Summit – 
Leaders’ Statement, 2 April 
2009, available at https://
www.imf.org/external/
np/sec/pr/2009/pdf/
g20_040209.pdf.
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structures have remained weak and 
informal, and all attempts to give 
them a more formal structure have 
ended in deadlock. Since the start of 
the decade divergent preferences on 
privacy and the limits of free speech, 
and more fundamentally state control 
over national citizens, have given rise 
to a process of balkanisation. The unity 
of the internet is a thing of the past and 
the question now is what geometry will 
emerge from its fragmentation.
The historic core of the global 
regime – trade and finance 
arrangements – is undergoing a 
process of fragmentation. Global 
rules and institutions are still there, 
but their authority is fast diminishing. 
Existing multilateral arrangements 
lost muscle already in the 2000s and 
the early 2010s, and the process is 
accelerating. A new geography made 
up of partially overlapping blocs has 
started to emerge: trade rules are giving 
way to a new US-initiated bilateralism 
and the one success the WTO could 
claim, its conflict resolution system, is 
on its way to paralysis; development 
finance is undergoing a process of 
geographically-centred fragmentation, 
most notably as a consequence of 
the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative 
and its adverse consequences for 
multilateral debt relief procedures; in 
international finance, several layers of 
unilateral, bilateral and regional safety 
nets have piled up, not least because 
of the need to tackle the euro crisis, 
while the centrality of the IMF is being 
questioned; further disruption may 
well arise in the medium term with 
the emergence of a multi-currency 
monetary system.
2 GEOPOLITICAL OBSTACLES
The post-2016 political context cer-
tainly complicates global governance. 
International rules and institutions em-
body all that populist nationalists love 
to hate: a non-national definition of 
the common good, equality of nations, 
supranational bureaucracies, limits 
to discretionary power, rules-based 
decision-making and the influence of 
experts in policy design. More broadly, 
concerns over national sovereignty are 
on the rise nearly everywhere.
The stance of the Trump 
administration is currently the single 
most significant obstacle to global 
collective action. Its worldview does 
not build on the premise that a series 
of issues require global cooperation 
and that well-structured joint action 
can yield benefits for all participants. 
It favours a transactional approach 
to international relations and regards 
most international issues as zero-sum 
games.
However, US grievances against, 
and doubts about global rules 
and institutions did not start with 
Trump. Already in the 1940s, the 
US Congress rejected membership 
of the US-designed International 
Trade Organisation. President 
Clinton objected to the creation of 
the International Criminal Court. 
President George W. Bush refused to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The Obama 
administration expressed serious 
concerns about the functioning of the 
WTO.
Changes in the international 
stance of the US reveal America’s 
deep and widely-shared doubts 
about the benefits of continued 
international leadership in the 
current context. In the post-war 
period up to the 2000s, the US mostly 
played by the international rules and 
furthermore acted as a guarantor and 
an insurer of the global system. This 
stance rested on the leverage that the 
system provided to the global hegemon, 
but also on the hypothesis that it was 
in its best interests to promote, uphold 
and guarantee a global rules-based 
regime. Yet the declining relative 
economic weight of the US is prompting 
a reassessment of the benefits that the 
‘indispensable nation’ derives from 
trading-off exorbitant duties for an 
exorbitant privilege.
China’s assertiveness questions 
the stability of the global system. 
Seen from Beijing, the rules-based 
system embodies the preferences and 
privileges of the incumbent powers. 
Whereas China values an open global 
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trading regime, it has no ownership of 
a system that was designed by Western 
powers and whose rules embody 
their preferences. The significance 
of the Belt and Road Inititiative for 
global governance remains unclear, 
but it might be sowing the seeds of a 
different kind of system of international 
economic relations.
The US is reassessing its decades-
long strategy towards China. From 
Richard Nixon to Barack Obama, 
all US presidents followed the same 
inclusive approach. It was assumed 
that China’s disruptive power could 
best be tamed by shaping the direction 
of its development by making it a full 
member of the rules-based global 
economic community. But if this 
strategy has helped China to develop 
and catch up technologically, it has 
not led to system convergence and it 
has not contained geopolitical rivalry. 
Consequently, the US increasingly 
regards China as a strategic threat.
Europe remains the staunchest 
advocate of the multilateral system 
but it lacks strength and coherence. 
As a rules-based construct, the 
European Union feels at home in a 
rules-based system and regards itself as 
a laboratory of global governance. But 
it is not ready to stand in for the US as 
an anchor of the system and its hesitant 
response to the euro crisis contributed 
to its weakening.
3 ECONOMIC CHALLENGES
Beyond China, the emergence of a 
multipolar world economy is a sys-
temic challenge to the operation of 
the global policy regime. Together 
with rules that apply to all countries, the 
post-war regime rested on the assump-
tion that the US was responsible for ex-
ercising leadership and for undertaking 
discretionary action in times of crisis. It 
was implicitly agreed that the US would 
remain the issuer of the main interna-
tional currency and that it would act as 
liquidity provider of last resort, importer 
of last resort and crisis manager of last 
resort. In an economically more bal-
anced global system, it is not clear how 
these roles could be distributed.
The heterogeneity of preferences 
is an obstacle to collective action. As 
participants in global interaction have 
become economically, systemically 
and culturally more diverse, it has 
become harder to agree on rules and 
governance mechanisms. From the 
Bretton Woods conference in 1944 to 
Chinese accession to the WTO in 2001, 
the broadening of global governance 
proceeded by gradually co-opting 
new members into clubs whose 
basic rules had been written by their 
creators. The failure of the Doha round 
symbolically signalled that this process 
of homogenisation had come to an end. 
Developing countries, big and small, 
rightly claim that they cannot be simply 
asked to sign up to rules that were 
shaped by the preferences of advanced 
countries. But while they have often 
been effective veto players, their 
positive contributions have been rare. 
Notwithstanding the BRICS, developing 
and emerging countries lack unity and 
leadership.
The formal architecture of global 
economic and financial governance 
is increasingly at odds with the shape 
and intensity of interdependence. 
The WTO’s mandate was predicated 
on an economic interdependence 
model that has been superseded by 
the rise of global value chains and 
foreign investment, and that is being 
overburdened by attempts to adjudicate 
trade-related matters increasingly 
removed from trade. The lack of a 
competition arm is increasingly a 
concern in the context of globally rising 
market power. The mandates of the 
Bretton Woods institutions relied on a 
financial interdependence model that 
has been superseded by unfettered 
capital flows, international banking 
and cross-border balance sheet 
interdependence. Moreover, major 
new interlinkages have developed 
that do not belong to the remit of 
any significant institution. This is 
evidently the case for environmental 
externalities, data flows and migration, 
to name only the most important.
The growing asymmetry of the 
global economic system weakens 
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multilateral rules and institutions. 
Network-based interdependence in 
fields including finance, international 
currency, global value chains and data 
flows, confers exorbitant power and 
responsibility on whoever controls the 
nodes of the system. The assumption 
that all countries are equal has never 
matched reality. But interdependence 
once seemed to be an equalising force. 
This is less the case today than ten or 
twenty years ago.
Conflicting representations of the 
same reality are a serious obstacle 
to collective action. This is evidently 
the case for climate change denial, 
but also for less extreme forms of 
disagreement, as recently illustrated 
by European disputes over the solution 
to the euro crisis. Battles of ideas are 
often harder to win than disputes 
arising from divergent interests. This 
problem is bound to be significantly 
greater in a more diverse world. 
Investment in the building of common 
knowledge through the development 
of epistemic communities remains the 
most effective, though limited way to 
overcome such obstacles2.
4  THE TOOLKIT FOR COLLECTIVE 
ACTION
Ambitious global agreements on new, 
legally binding rules supported by new, 
universal institutions are highly im-
probable. The political and geopolitical 
conditions for such agreements are un-
likely to be fulfilled anytime soon. In this 
context the strategy for rekindling inter-
national collective action can neither be 
to simply and uncritically defend a now 
inadequate twentieth-century system, 
nor to make plans for unrealistic reforms. 
The response must be to make the most 
of the web of existing rules and institu-
tions inherited from the previous decades 
and to combine them with softer, much 
more ad-hoc forms of governance of in-
terdependence and global public-goods 
management.
Soft mechanisms that do not 
curtail national sovereignty can 
effectively tackle a whole category of 
collective-action problems. Solutions 
to such problems do not necessarily 
require compulsion, hard international 
rules or delegation of decision-making 
powers to international organisations. 
The prisoners’ dilemma model is 
less universally applicable than 
often believed and many obstacles 
to coordination can be tackled by 
ensuring transparency, creating trust 
and monitoring actual behaviour. 
In banking regulation, for example, 
significant results have been achieved 
through the negotiation of non-
mandatory global standards and 
the thorough monitoring of their 
implementation. Such examples should 
of course not be overinterpreted: not 
all problems can be tackled by soft 
mechanisms. And the price to pay for 
the involvement of private players is 
often that they gain influence over the 
policy process. But for a whole range 
of problems, information exchange, 
indicative standards or pledge-and-
review mechanisms can deliver 
results – on the condition that national 
behaviour is monitored effectively and 
transparently.
Cooperation between independent 
national agencies endowed with 
similar mandates can also achieve 
significant results. Historically, central 
banks have provided a template for 
international collective action by 
being able to cooperate effectively 
on the basis of domestically-oriented 
monetary policy mandates. The same 
applies to sectoral regulatory policies. 
The record of such cooperation is 
uneven: it has often been disappointing 
in the field of financial oversight, 
but significant results have been 
achieved in the competition policy 
field, where national authorities 
exercise extraterritorial powers in a 
cooperative manner. Independent 
regulators generally work on the basis 
of common knowledge and common 
beliefs, which provide a platform for 
coordinated action. They cannot by 
themselves internalise externalities, but 
they can and do prevent disputes, share 
information and organise coordination.
‘Clubs’ or groupings of countries 
can effectively address hard 
collective-action problems, but they 
2.  Epistemic communities 
are networks of knowledge 
professionals (scien-
tists and policy experts) 
whose consensus and/or 
framing of issues helps to 
shape public policies. The 
Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) 
and the network of experts 
and institutions around 
it provides a well-known 
example of such commu-
nities. Another example is 
monetary experts linked to 
central banks.
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involve the risk of fragmentation. 
Soft forms of cooperation are hardly 
applicable to a collection of 200+ 
countries. They are more effective 
when the number of significant players 
remains limited – as in the cases of 
central banking, competition and 
banking regulation. Coalitions of 
the willing have developed in many 
fields, starting with international 
trade, sectoral regulation and the 
environment, where the Montreal 
Protocol on the elimination of 
substances harming the ozone layer 
provided an early template. The 
forming on a voluntary basis of sectoral, 
regional or development level-based 
coalitions can be an effective conduit to 
collective action, though at the cost that 
the policy choices embedded in flexible 
international agreements can be biased 
towards the preferences of their initial 
members, thereby restricting their size 
and limiting the gains they deliver.
The adoption of a dynamic 
perspective can strengthen otherwise 
weak incentives for joint action. Some 
global problems bring about strong 
incentives to free-ride on common 
disciplines, either by failing to commit 
or by failing to implement. Common-
pool problems are of this sort and 
addressing them requires stronger 
cooperation incentives than those 
provided by trust-building devices 
and the monitoring of delivery against 
existing commitments. But these 
obstacles can be reduced (though not 
eliminated) by involving private-sector 
players, which can buttress otherwise 
feeble cooperation agreements. 
For example, the Paris Agreement 
on containing climate change does 
not involve any compulsion and 
even lacks mechanisms to enforce 
compliance with the commitments 
made. It is therefore vulnerable to the 
free-rider curse. But together with 
regulatory intiatives in key markets, 
it has been effective enough for part 
of the manufacturing industries’ 
research and development efforts to 
be redirected towards zero-emission 
technologies. Their incentive to act is 
based on the perceived cost of losing 
out in international competition by 
failing to keep up with clean technology 
developments. The effectiveness 
of such a mechanism does not rest 
on universal participation but on 
the participation of a critical mass 
of committed states and on the 
expectation that access to their markets 
will depend on the adoption of clean 
technologies.
Political leadership plays a 
decisive role by setting priorities and 
overcoming the curse of unanimity. 
Whereas the G20 has not lived up to 
the hopes that it would give rise to a 
permanent economic coordination 
apparatus, it has been much more 
effective as an orchestrator and 
agenda-setter. It has occasionally been 
an arm-twister too. An important 
example is taxation: whereas agreement 
on eliminating bank secrecy proved 
impossible to reach within the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, or within the EU, the 
combination of US unilateral action, 
G20 pressure and OECD expertise made 
it possible to overcome opposition. A 
similar game might have started in the 
field of corporate taxation.
5 THE POLICY AGENDA
Effective collective action for the 
twenty-first century should make 
careful use of the limited political 
capital available for multilateral 
endeavours. It can rely neither on an 
outdated and disputed global govern-
ance model nor on non-committal 
intentions and the involvement of a 
multitude of stakeholders. The range 
of solutions available without recourse 
to hard international law is however 
significant. What is needed is to make 
best use of necessarily limited legal, 
institutional and financial resources. 
Collective action can rest on a series 
of principles that command universal 
support, such as national treatment for 
trade or the no-beggar-thy-neighbour 
principle in international finance. Such 
principles should be buttressed by a set 
of nimble institutions able to provide 
support to international cooperation, 
and their implementation should be 
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based on precise matching procedures 
that assign adequate resources, in-
stitutions and mechanisms to clearly 
identified problems.
A way to control the risk of 
fragmentation involved in the 
reliance on clubs or groupings of 
countries would be to require them 
be rooted in common universal 
principles (‘minilateralism’). This 
is actually the case with regional 
or sectoral trade agreements: they 
are subject to WTO scrutiny, must 
respect fundamental principles such 
as national treatment and unless they 
meet certain conditions, they should 
uphold the most-favoured nation 
principle. Compliance with such 
principles has ensured some coherence 
in the evolution of the international 
trading system. Similar issues arise in 
a series of fields, from investment to 
regulation to climate to financial safety 
nets.
Existing institutions – which can 
be regarded as globalisation’s social 
capital – should be requested to serve 
collective action beyond the confines 
of their sectoral remits. Global 
institutions were once regarded as the 
masters of sectoral fiefdoms within the 
multilateral system. But nowadays the 
fiefdoms hardly cover globalisation’s 
territory. With the principles, 
procedures and governance they are 
equipped with, institutions should 
rather be regarded as wells of social and 
informational capital that international 
collective action can draw from. The 
evolution of the Bank for International 
Settlements (from the collector of 
German war reparations to the architect 
of global banking regulation), the IMF 
(from the coordinator of a financially 
autarkic world to that of a financially 
integrated one), the World Bank (from 
an infrastructure bank for Europe to, 
among other things, the promoter girls’ 
education in Africa) and especially 
the OECD (from the administrator 
of the European payments union to, 
among other things, the assessor of 
worldwide education systems) shows 
that institutions – some of them at 
least – can be nimble. A key priority 
for international collective action is to 
make the most of this social capital. 
This implies tasking institutions with 
responsibilities for ex-ante assessment, 
ex-post monitoring, evaluation and 
support for negotiation in fields that 
extend beyond their usual remits.
For universal institutions to be 
effective, it is essential to preserve 
their legitimacy. As far as rules are 
concerned, this requires distinguishing 
essential principles that command 
general recognition from more specific 
provisions that reflect the preferences 
of advanced economies, or a subset 
of them. The re-examination of the 
IMF doctrine on financial account 
liberalisation was a case in point, as 
the institution departed from its initial 
stance to take on board the concerns 
of emerging countries facing repeated 
sudden stops. As far as governance 
is concerned, legitimacy necessarily 
requires adjusting representation and 
voting rights to the new realities of 
demographic, economic and political 
development on a global scale. 
Institutions whose policy doctrines or 
modus operandi are perceived as being 
excessively dominated by incumbent 
powers are bound to lose legitimacy 
and to be partially substituted by 
alternative sectoral or regional 
groupings. Europe in this respect 
should wake-up to the trade-off it faces: 
either to preserve its power in existing 
multilateral institutions, with the risk 
of accelerating their obsolescence, or 
to concede a reduction of its role and 
direct influence, with the risk of not 
gaining much in exchange.
The involvement of knowledge 
networks, civil society and 
subnational governments 
(‘polylateralism’) can add to the 
effectiveness of otherwise feeble 
mechanisms. Shared knowledge 
is essential to identify issues and 
overcome obstacles to cooperation 
arising from divergent representations 
of the same problem. This is why the 
creation of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change was a major 
step towards a shared awareness of 
problems and solutions (and the 
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absence of a shared knowledge base 
is also a reason why international 
agreement is so difficult in the field of 
migration). In domains that speak to 
public opinion like the preservation 
of the environment, public health or 
the fight against tax evasion, pressure 
from below might also help counter the 
incentives to free-ride that governments 
are subject to, and could help overcome 
obstacles to collective action. But 
polylateralism risks being too weak to 
overcome obstacles to collective action 
in critical fields such as climate change.
In the absence of compulsory 
universal agreements, some 
collective-action problems can 
only be tackled by having recourse 
to sanctions, pecuniary levies and 
international transfers. Whereas it is 
wrong to assume that all international 
collective-action problems can be 
represented by a prisoners’ dilemma 
game, it is equally incorrect to 
assume that all can be solved without 
mechanisms that contain free-riding. 
Without universally enforceable rules, 
such mechanisms can be provided 
by strict rules agreed to by countries 
entering into a club arrangement. This 
is most evident in the climate field: 
should a group of countries decide to 
implement significant carbon taxes 
while their trade partners abstain 
from introducing them, a border tax 
would serve both as a way to limit the 
risks of endogenous breakdown of 
the climate coalition, and as a way to 
ensure its members do not lose out in 
international trade. The critical question 
in the years to come will be whether the 
US joins the climate club (in which case 
it will most certainly introduce border 
taxes) or whether the EU and other 
climate-conscious players introduce 
border taxes in an effort to discipline 
the US and other free-riders.
Democratic legitimacy is harder 
to ensure in a world of ad-hoc 
arrangements. Whereas it is a concern 
in a rules-based order, at least rules 
must be ratified and institutions can 
be subject to parliamentary oversight. 
A world that relies on a proliferation 
of clubs, institutions that operate 
beyond their mandates, private-sector 
participation and soft arrangements 
is superficially less constraining, but 
substantially more alien to democratic 
principles. At the very least, it 
requires close scrutiny by civil-society 
organisations.
Europe should equip itself to be an 
effective player in this new game. It 
cannot rely anymore on a global regime 
and on the US willingness to uphold 
it. External influence and leadership 
are European public goods that should 
be given priority and be buttressed by 
adequate internal governance.
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